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"Reform in China and Russia: A Comparative Perspective" published on by Oxford University Press.

Local elections have been occurring in most villages for over a decade in rural China, and competitive elections are one of the key indicators of the democratic process. Indeed, competition is an important aspect of any democracy, and it increases the value of a villager's vote—so much so that in some villages, a farmer's vote can be worth a small fortune. As village elections become more competitive, reports of vote buying are on the rise, and a number of journalists and academic researchers have condemned this growing practice in rural China. Accordingly, vote buying subverts democratic development and hinders democratization efforts. However, vote buying has a long history in well‐established democracies, such as the United States and Great Britain. Rather than subverting democratization, vote buying can be viewed as part of the process or the price of democracy. While policies and laws are needed to control vote buying in the long run, initially it is a positive indicator that voting is an important and valuable process in rural China.

Local elections have been occurring in most villages for over a decade in rural China, and competitive elections are one of the key indicators of the democratic process. Indeed, competition is an important aspect of any democracy, and it increases the value of a villager's vote-so much so that in some villages, a farmer's vote can be worth a small fortune. As village elections become more competitive, reports of vote buying are on the rise, and a number of journalists and academic researchers have condemned this growing practice in rural China. Accordingly, vote buying subverts democratic development and hinders democratization efforts. However, vote buying has a long history in well-established democracies, such as the United States and Great Britain. Rather than subverting democratization, vote buying can be viewed as part of the process or the price of democracy. While policies and laws are needed to control vote buying in the long run, initially it is a positive indicator that voting is an important and valuable process in rural China. Adapted from the source document.

Literature on public opinion in China suggests that public support for the Chinese Communist party (CCP) is quite high. No matter how survey questions regarding regime support are phrased, the results are the same. The obvious question arises: how does an authoritarian regime, such as the PRC, garner the support of the vast majority of its citizens? I argue that the exposure-acceptance model best explains the high level of public support in China. This model suggests that educated citizens, who are politically aware, display high levels of political support within an authoritarian regime, but citizens at the highest levels of education are more resistant to political messages and tend to have lower levels of support. However, in a developing country such as China there are unequal educational opportunities for rural and urban citizens. This has a significant influence on how education affects regime support. Despite lower levels of support among the most educated citizens, the CCP still manages to maintain a high level of popular support through strict control over the media and education system.

Over the last decade, there have been numerous reports of rural discontent and unrest over excessive local taxes and fees known as villagers' burdens. In response, the central government enacted the tax-for-fee reform (TFR) in 2002 that abolished local fees levied on individuals and rural households in favour of a single agricultural tax. In addition the central government has announced plans to eliminate the agricultural tax as well after 2006. The aim of the TFR is to streamline local revenue collection and establish a more transparent and efficient provision of services. The immediate result, however, is a dramatic reduction in the autonomy of township governments as well as the provision of local services. Poorer townships have become more dependent on county government for revenues, and these townships function more like county administrative units than local self-governments. Moreover, many services have also been cut due to a lack of local revenues. In north-west China, there has been a sharp decline in the provision of educational and medical services. The solution is an increase in county remittances, but these are slow and uneven, and the combination of reduced autonomy and services has produced a number of "administrative shells" at the township level. If the inefficacy continues, then there may be even greater rural discontent and unrest over the loss of basic services than there was over increasing villagers' burdens.